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Abstract
The paper provides a theoretical rationale for flexicurity policies, which
consist of low employment protection, generous unemployment insurance and
active labor market programmes. It analyzes in which conditions flexicurity
can be optimal. Low employment protection encourages costly education ef-
forts to access high productivity and high innovation sectors, with firms more
likely to survive and thus not exposing much their workers to unemployment
risk. Activation programmes support the reallocation flow from unproductive
to productive firms, helping to reduce unemployment. Low employment pro-
tection thus provides incentives for costly self-insurance against unemployment
risk through education, mitigating the moral hazard cost of unemployment in-
surance and activation programmes. The paper provides realistic numerical
illustrations where flexicurity is optimal, and where it is not optimal.
Keywords: flexicurity, unemployment insurance, job protection, active labor
market policy, education.
JEL-Classification: J64, J65, J68, J32, H30
1 Introduction
Unemployment remains high in many developed countries. Flexicurity, based on low
employment protection, generous unemployment benefits and active labor market
policies, has been associated with encouraging signs of unemployment reduction,
in Denmark and the Netherlands. Policy analysis present flexicurity as a viable
∗Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Stumpergasse 56, 1060 Vienna, Austria. Contact:
davoine@ihs.ac.at. For useful comments, I am grateful to Christian Keuschnigg, Martin Kolmar,
Volker Grossmann and participants in seminars at the Universities of Dortmund, Munich and
St.Gallen, and at the L.A. Gerard-Varet conference in Marseille.
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option (Bovenberg and Wilthagen, 2009). It is also an example of policy moving
ahead of science. This paper provides a theoretical rationale for flexicurity based
on education. I show flexicurity can help speed up the job reallocation process
due to negative productivity shocks and labor market frictions, encouraging self-
insurance through education, balancing low unemployment with high output growth
and delivering utilitarian welfare gains.
With one exception, there are no complete theoretical analysis of flexicurity.
There exists a large number of studies which consider a subset of the three policy
instruments of flexicurity. For instance, unemployment insurance and employment
protection have been jointly considered by Pissarides (2001). Most theoretical anal-
ysis of active labor market policies also consider unemployment insurance, including
Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006) and Andersen and Svarer (2014).
Using a combination of instruments makes theoretical models more complicated.
To capture interactions and complementarities of the labor market policies and the
full potential of flexicurity, one needs however to analyze all three instruments si-
multaneously. Andersen and Svarer (2007) remind for instance that low protection
and generous unemployment benefits were already in place well before the rise in
unemployment in Denmark, following the mid-1970’s oil shock. Only after imple-
mentation of active labor market policies did unemployment start to decrease.
Brown, Merkl and Snower (2009) is the only joint analysis of the three policy
instruments of flexicurity. They however treat employment protection as a firing
cost and miss the potential complementarity effect of firing taxes and unemployment
benefits highlighted by Blanchard and Tirole (2008).
This paper builds on Davoine and Keuschnigg (2010) and considers firing taxes
(as employment protection), unemployment insurance and active labor market poli-
cies, without any preconception of what their optimal level is. Its main contribution
is a theoretical rationale for flexicurity. I analytically show that the optimal public
policy is flexicurity, under certain conditions related to endogenous education de-
cisions. With a plausible calibration, numerical examples where flexicurity is the
optimal policy, and where it is not, are provided. A companion paper Davoine
and Keuschnigg (2015) performs an analysis to investigate the benefits of coupling
flexicurity with redistribution or re-employment wage subsidies.
I use a model where low productivity firms may have to downsize or shut down
and fire workers. To be hired by high productivity and innovative firms, which
reduces exposure to unemployment risk, households need to educate, at a cost.
Firing, job search and education decisions are endogenous. I follow Blanchard and
Tirole (2008) to model firing decisions, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) as well as
Chetty (2008) for job search decisions and Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante
(2010) for education decisions.
Government offers unemployment benefits to the unemployed, financed by labor
income taxes and, if any, firing taxes. Unemployed are enrolled in active labor
market programmes, which help them retrain and find jobs, but are time consuming
and reduce benefits of home production. Each policy instrument comes with a
trade-off. High unemployment insurance increases the welfare of the unemployed
but reduces the incentive to search for a job. High firing taxes reduces the inflow
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into unemployment but reduces the incentive to educate and join safer, innovative
and productive firms. Large active labor market programmes speed up reallocation
but are costly, both for the unemployed and for the state.
The paper shows that flexicurity - low firing taxes, high unemployment benefits
and large active labor market programmes - is optimal under conditions related to
education and job search behavior. In particular, optimal unemployment insurance
and firing taxes are substitutes if education efforts decrease with firing taxes and
other conditions are satisfied. Intuitively, low firing taxes reduce employment pro-
tection in risky, low-productivity but free access firms while they increase education
efforts and access into safer, innovative and productive firms. A marginal decrease
of employment protection thus allows for a marginal increase of unemployment
benefits, as more households join safer firms. Flexicurity in this case encourages
self-insurance against unemployment risk through education, mitigating the moral
hazard cost of public unemployment insurance.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 contains analytical results. A
numerical illustration is provided in section 4 and a conclusion in section 5.
2 Model
Policy instruments which are part of flexicurity impact both firms and household
decisions. Consistent with empirical evidence, employment protection influences
firing decisions by firms (see for instance Boeri and Jimeno, 2005) while unemploy-
ment benefits and active labor market policy impacts the effort and the success
of job search (see respectively Krueger and Meyer, 2002; Card, Kluve and Weber,
2010).
Endogenous firm and household decisions responding to the three flexicurity
policy instruments create modelling complexity. To maintain tractability and obtain
analytical results, I keep the model simple in some dimensions. In particular, the
model is static, labor supply is inelastic and I use some reduced-form specifications.
The impact of these simplifications is discussed in section 5.
Firms and sectors Workers affected by firms closures need to seek jobs in sur-
viving firms. To analyze worker reallocation flows and their dependence on policy,
I separate firms in two sectors. In the first sector, I regroup firms which innovate
little, have a low productivity and face a high risk of closure. The second sector
consist of firms which innovate, install new production process, are more produc-
tive and more likely to survive. The precise definition and characteristics of sectors
follows.
All firms employ exactly one worker and produce the same good, which I take as
numeraire1. In a static framework with inelastic labor supply normalized to unity,
production is Ricardian.
Innovation allows firms from the second sector to produce at a cheaper cost. For
1Extending the model to multiple goods, one could also integrate a simple form of Schum-
peterian creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1942; Aghion and Howitt, 1994). Sector 1 firms which
do not innovate may see their market stolen by sector 2 firms, which offer new products. If this
happens to a sector 1 firm, it needs to close down and sends its workers into unemployment.
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simplicity, I assume that firms in the second sector always survive and that they
are equal (that is, there is a representative firm). While there is uncertainty in the
first sector, there is none in the second sector.
Uncertainty and firm behavior in the first sector is taken from Blanchard and
Tirole (2008). There are four phases in the life of a sector 1 firm. First, an investor
decides to create a firm2. Second, the firm hires one worker at an agreed wage.
Assuming free entry, expected profits are driven down to zero, so that the wage
will be equal in all firms, w1. Third, the firm learns about the level of competition
from innovative firms. Relative to the representative firm in sector 2, it is given
a productivity which is high or low. The relative productivity shock x ∈ [0,∞)
is drawn from a given distribution with density g (x). Four, the firm decides to
operate or close down. If its relative productivity x is high, it can survive and
expects a profit x−w1. If it is too low, it will make no profit. The firm has to pay
a tax ts if it decides to downsize, close down and fire the worker3.
The firm decides to operate if and only if x−w1 ≥ −ts. The level x1 ≡ w1−ts is
the cut-off productivity above which the firm continues to operate and below which
it closes down. Clearly policy influences firms decisions: the higher the firing tax,
the lower the rate of firm exits and the flow of workers into unemployment. The
tax thus can be used as employment protection (EP). Given these definitions, the
separation rate is
s = s (x1) =
ˆ x1
0
g (x) dx. (1)
I assume that firm owners are risk-neutral and operate a portfolio of firms4. Then,
owners start with several firms and pay firing taxes for these firms which need to
close down with the profit they make from surviving firms. Taking into account
policy on firing and the level of competition, expected profits upon entry are
pi =
ˆ ∞
x1
(x− w1) g (x) dx− sts = (1− s) (xa − w1)− sts > 0, (2)
where xa ≡ ´∞x1 xg (x) dx
/
(1− s) is the average productivity of surviving firms.
Free entry drives expected profits to zero. Given the relative productivity distri-
bution g (x) and firing taxes ts, this pins down the sector 1 wage w1. Higher firing
taxes thus not only reduces the separation rate s but also the average productivity
level xa and thus the equilibrium wage w1. Sector 1 workers thus both lose and win
from higher firing taxes.
Firms in sector 2 are innovative and safe. They are identical and offer an
exogenously given wage w2 to workers. I assume that sector 2 is big enough to ensure
a level of competition due to innovation such that (via the sector 1 productivity
2In reality, investors often have to pay sunk investment costs. I add these costs in the numerical
illustration.
3Notice periods, firing rules and severance payments are more common than firing taxes as a
mean of employment protection in OECD countries. Even though not widespread, firing taxes
remain a realistic policy instrument. The US for instance uses firing taxes (via the so-called
experience rating system for financing unemployment insurance). Blanchard and Tirole (2008)
identify an optimal complementarity of firing taxes and unemployment insurance, which can play
an important role in the optimality (or not) of flexicurity. One can also think of severance payments
as a bundled firing tax with unemployment insurance.
4Alternatively, we could assume that there is a financial intermediation sector with perfect
competition and which is costless.
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distribution g)
w1 < w2. (3)
Intuitively, it makes sense that the innovating sector has higher productivity and
thus can offer higher wages. With free entry of firms into sector 2 and no uncertainty,
there are no profits so the output of each firm equals the wage w2. While entry is free
for firms, it is costly for workers: development and operation of high productivity
processes depends on innovation performed by skilled workers, who went through
a costly education. Workers entry into sectors will be presented below.
Labor market The labor market is imperfect, due to relocation costs, skill mis-
match, search and other frictions. Unproductive firms from sector 1 fire their work-
ers, who become unemployed. During unemployment, workers engage in home
production5 h, retrain to acquire the skills needed for sector 2 and search for a job
in that sector. If the retraining and search are successful, they leave unemployment.
Otherwise, they remain unemployed.
As Chetty (2008), I borrow from Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) the modelling
of search effort decisions, based on reduced-form specifications. Let e ∈ [0, 1] be the
individual retraining and search efforts by unemployed workers6. By a suitable nor-
malization and the law of large numbers, e also represents the probability of finding
a job in sector 2 after separation from sector 1. The reduced form specification ζ (e)
captures search effort costs, in utility terms. I assume that utility costs increase
with effort and that finding a job becomes increasingly difficult with effort, ζ ′ > 0
and ζ ′′ > 0. A rapidly increasing function ζ (e) also captures the difficulty of find-
ing a job due to adverse labor market conditions, such as job rationing (Michaillat,
2012).
Government provides unemployment insurance (UI) benefits b to unemployed
workers and enrolls them in active labor market programmes (ALMP). These pro-
grammes include job search assistance, retraining courses and can also include mon-
itoring and sanctions (for a recent overview, see Card, Kluve and Weber, 2010).
Whether or not they include monitoring and sanctions, participation in these pro-
grammes takes time, reducing the output or benefit unemployed workers derive
from home production7. Figure 1 provides an overview of the labor market and
reallocation flows.
Let m ≥ 0 be the amount of active labor market programmes provided to
unemployed workers and let the reduced forms ψ (m) and φ (m) capture the two
essential dimensions of these programmes. The first dimension reduces the output
or benefit from home production to ψ (m)h, with ψ (m) ∈ [0, 1], ψ (0) = 1, and
ψ′ < 0: the larger the provision of activation measures, the lower the time for
or the enjoyment of home production. Monitoring and sanctions can also be part
of these measures. The second dimension increases the likelihood of finding a job,
5Aguiar, Hurst and Karabarbounis (2013), among other empirical studies, find that home
production increases during unemployment. For simplicity I assume employed workers do not
engage in home production.
6For ease of presentation, I will only refer to search efforts in the continuation.
7In their joint analysis of unemployment insurance and workfare (a special type of active labor
market policy), Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006) as well as Andersen and Svarer (2014) also
assume that workfare reduce the time available for home production (or leisure).
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Sector 1 Sector 2
Risky
Low productivity
Low wage w1
Costly entry
Safe
High productivity
High wage w2
Unemployment
Benefits
Search assistance
Successful
search
Unsuccessful
search
Bad
shock
Figure 1: Labor market and reallocation flows
reducing the retraining and search effort to φ (m) ζ (e), with φ (m) ∈ [0, 1], φ (0) = 1,
φ′ < 0 < φ′′: the larger the amount of job search assistance and retraining courses,
the more likely to find a job; however, activation programmes become increasingly
less efficient.
Households Households are heterogenous in their learning capacity. Education
is costly but gives access to the safe, productive and high paying sector 2, consistent
with the empirical assortative matching literature (see for instance, Haltiwanger,
Lane and Spletzer, 1999). By design, non educated workers are exposed to unem-
ployment risk while educated workers are not, consistent with empirical evidence
(Nickell, 1979).
Endogenous education decisions are made as in Heathcote, Storesletten and
Violante (2010). Households are arranged by their innate learning ability n ∈ [0, 1],
uniformly distributed. Education is a costly process requiring efforts, in small
amount for high ability households and in large amounts for low ability ones. The
effort cost i (n) function captures the utility cost of becoming educated, assumed to
be continuous and increasing i′ > 0, with i (0) = 0 and i (n)→∞ for n→ 1. Low
n indicates low effort cost and high ability. At low ability, efforts cost become very
large, reflecting the need of a minimum intellectual capacity for higher education.
The decision to educate or not, equivalently to join sector 2 or sector 1, de-
pends on learning ability, the utility value derived from income in each sector and
unemployment risk.
Households are risk averse and, in a static environment, consume their income.
With a concave increasing utility function u, labor income tax tl, the utility after
joining sector 2 is
V2 = u ((1− tl)w2) . (4)
Given unemployment risk, utility from joining sector 1 is expressed in expected
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terms:
V1 = (1− s) · u ((1− tl)w1) + s · ue, (5)
ue = maxe e · u ((1− tl)w2) + (1− e) · u (ψ (m)h+ b)− φ (m) ζ (e) .
With probability 1 − s, a worker joining sector 1 is hired by a firm having a large
survival chance (drawing a large relative productivity shock), in which case the
worker keeps its job, earn wages w1 and pay taxes at rate tl. With probability s,
the worker is hired by a firm with low productivity and subsequently closing down.
In this case, the worker is fired and enjoys expected utility ue. As seen previously
and for a given amount of active labor market programmes m, fired workers spend
efforts e at net utility cost φ(m)ζ (e) to retrain and find a job in sector 2. By the
law of large number and via renormalization, e also represents the probability of
finding a job. If unsuccessful, fired workers remain unemployed, consuming welfare
benefits b and home production ψ (m)h, net of activation measures8.
The endogenous allocation of workers to sector takes place as follows. Individ-
uals born with high learning ability (low n) will spent (low) efforts i (n) to educate
and join the safe and high paying sector 2. Individuals with low ability find educa-
tion efforts too large, will not educate and join the risky and low paying sector 1.
In between, there is a household with ability N who is indifferent between the two
sectors,
V1 = V2 − i(N). (6)
Households with ability n ≤ N will educate and join sector 2. Those with ability
n > N will not educate and join sector 1. With a population size normalized to
one and recalling that ability n is uniformly distributed, N also measures the entry
rate into the costly9 but safe and high paying sector 2.
Aggregates Taking separation and reallocation flows into account, households
can end up in one of three states: employed in sector 1, employed in sector 2 or
unemployed. The respective size of each group is given by
L1 = (1− s) (1−N) L2 = N + es (1−N) δ = (1− e) s (1−N) , (7)
with δ the unemployment rate. Since each firm hires exactly one worker, the final
number of firms in each sector is given by L1 and L2. Given the Ricardian pro-
duction technology, inelastic labor supply and sector 1 average productivity xa, the
total production in each sector and gross domestic product are respectively
X1 = (1− s)xa (1−N) X2 = w2L2 X = X1 +X2 (8)
8I assume that the level b of unemployment benefits is non-degenerate, in the sense that being
hit by the unemployment shock is worse than not being hit by the shock, u ((1− tl)w1) > ue.
An alternative assumption to prevent spontaneous quits from sector 1 workers is that the search
effort costs ζ are large and active labor market programmes φ quickly inefficient.
9Note that entry costs into sector 2 can include other costs than education. For instance,
they can represent foregone consumption opportunities in a static model (or liquidity constraints
in a dynamic model) or restrictions to higher education (such as numerus clausus). For ease of
presentation, I continue the presentation with education costs only, but may refer to entry costs
in general.
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Government To each unemployed worker, the government provides unemploy-
ment insurance benefits b and active labor market programmes in quantity m at
unit cost k. The government also has own consumption C. It finances expenditures
with labor income taxes at rate tl and firing taxes ts. Ruling out government debt
by imposing balance in the budget, the net fiscal balance satisfies
T = tlw2L2 + tlw1L1 + tss (1−N)− [δb+mks (1−N) + C] = 0 (9)
3 Theoretical analysis
I start by characterizing firms and households behavior and continue with properties
of optimal policy. I finish with the main theoretical result, an identification of
flexicurity as optimal, or non-optimal, policy.
To obtain compact formulas, I use the notation u1 ≡ u ((1− tl)w1), uh ≡
u (ψ(m)h+ b) as well as u2 ≡ u ((1− tl)w2). The index refers to the final state of
the worker, employed in sector 1, engaged in home production while unemployed
or employed in sector 2. Further notations will be presented in due time.
3.1 Behavior
Firms behavior The only uncertainty lies in sector 1: low productivity firms are
threatened by competition and may decide to fire their workers and close down if
their relative productivity level is too low. High productivity firms, in sector 2, face
no uncertainty. The only decision by firms is firing, in sector 1.
Under free entry expected profit pi is driven to zero, defining the firing be-
havior and pinning down the equilibrium wage w1. Using (1) and (2), the sen-
sitivity of profit to firing and the cut-off productivity x1 are given by dpi/dx1 =
− (x1 − w1 + ts) g (x1). By the envelope theorem, dpi/dw1 = − (1− s) and dpi/dts =
−s. Combining and using the chain rule, the policy sensitivity of the equilibrium
wage w1 and the separation rate s, characterizing firing decisions, are given by
dw1
dts
= − s
1− s,
ds
dts
= −σs, σ ≡ g (x1)
(1− s) s. (10)
As expected, a larger firing tax ts reduces the separate rate. Because more unpro-
ductive jobs are kept alive with a larger tax, the average productivity in sector 1 is
lower. Free entry and zero expected profits then requires a lower equilibrium wage.
Household behavior In our static and inelastic labor supply framework, house-
holds take only two decisions: education and, if unemployed, search efforts. I
characterize search efforts decisions first.
If unemployed, workers choose search efforts to maximize the likelihood of find-
ing a job in the safe sector, taking into account the effort cost of searching, the
support m from active labor market programmes and the value of unemployment
benefits b. Formally, they choose effort e to maximize expected utility ue, defined
in (5). Differentiating and equating to zero, job search efforts satisfy
φ (m) ζ ′ (e) = u ((1− tl)w2)− u (ψ (m)h+ b) (11)
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Total differentiation then characterizes search response to policy changes,
de = −εww2e · dtl − εb (1− e) · db+ εm · dm, (12)
where
εw ≡ u
′
2
eφζ ′′
> 0, εb ≡ u
′
h
(1− e)φζ ′′ > 0, εm ≡ −
φ′ζ ′ + u′hψ
′h
φζ ′′
> 0.
Elasticity parameters εi capture the strength of the search response to policy
changes. For instance, when unemployment benefits b are small and increased, by
concavity of the utility function u, the elasticity εb is large and the search response
e drops much.
I continue with education decisions, characterized by the fraction N of house-
holds who choose to become educated.
The fraction N is defined by i(N) = V2 − V1, as per (6). Total differentiation
of (5) provides the variation of expected utility V1 with policy changes,
due = −u′2w2edtl + u′h (1− e) db+
[
(1− e)u′hψ′h− φ′ζ
]
dm,
dV1 = u
′
h (1− e) sdb− u′2w2esdtl +
[
(1− e)u′hψ′h− φ′ζ
]
sdm
−u′1w1 (1− s) dtl − (1− tl −∇σ)u′1sdts,
with the notational shortcut ∇ ≡ (u1 − ue) /u′1, positive by assumption on labor
market policy. An increase in unemployment benefits db > 0 increases the expected
utility ue of unemployed workers and thus the ex-ante utility V1 of workers who
choose the risky sector 1. Active labor market programmes have ambiguous effects:
more activation measures dm > 0 increases ex-ante utility V1 as long as the job
search assistance component −φ′ζ > 0 dominates the reduction of home production
benefits component (1− e)u′hψ′h < 0. Employment protection also has ambiguous
effects. A higher firing tax dts > 0 reduces firing by ds = −σsdts, thus increasing
expected utility by (u1 − ue) (−ds) = ∇u′1 (−ds). It also reduces the wage rate by
dw1 = − s1−sdts. As this event takes place with ex-ante probability 1− s, expected
utility is reduced by (1− s)u′1 (1− tl) dw1.
Total differentiation of i(N) = V2 − V1 leads to the following response equation
for education decisions,
dN = η1w1 (1− s) (1−N) dtl − η2w2 (1− es) dtl (13)
−ηh (1− e) s (1−N) db+ ηss (1−N) dts − ηms (1−N) dm,
where
η1 ≡ u
′
1
(1−N) i′ > 0, η2 ≡
u′2
i′
> 0, ηh ≡ u
′
h
(1−N) i′ > 0
ηs ≡ (1− tl −∇σ) η1, ηm ≡ (1− e)u
′
hψ
′h− φ′ζ
(1−N) i′ .
Higher unemployment benefits db > 0 reduce the loss due to sector 1 separation so
decreases education efforts. The signs of ηs and ηm may be positive or negative:
additional employment protection ts and active labor market programmes m have
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ambiguous effects, mirroring the dV1 variations discussed above. In particular,
education efforts are increased with activation programmes (ηm < 0) if and only
if the home production benefit reduction effect ((1− e)u′hψ′h < 0) dominates the
assistance effect (−φ′ζ > 0) for workers losing their sector 1 jobs.
Fiscal impacts Labor markets and the fiscal balance (9) are impacted by edu-
cation decisions dN , firing (separation) decisions ds and job search decisions de.
Effective tax rates τN , τS and τE for each margin capture the influence of behavior
on net tax revenue,
dT = (N + es (1−N))w2dtl + (1− s) (1−N) · w1dtl + (1− tl) s (1−N) · dts
− (1− e) s (1−N) · db− ks (1−N) · dm
+τN · dN + τS · (1−N) ds+ τE · s (1−N) de,
where
τE ≡ tlw2 +b, τS ≡ ts+[etlw2 − (1− e) b]−km− tlw1, τN ≡ tlw2− tlw1−sτS .
τE represents the effective tax rate on labor market participation, τS the effective
tax rate on firing and τN the effective tax rate on sector 2 entry. For every un-
employed person who finds a new job, there is a fiscal gain τE , summing up extra
revenue tlw2 and spared unemployment benefits b. The fiscal impact of job separa-
tion τS sums up the firing tax ts paid by firms and the average tax revenue gain from
separation etlw2 − tlw1 minus the unemployment insurance spending (1− e) b and
active labor market policy spending km. Net tax revenue rises by τN for each addi-
tional person who educates, adding the differences in workers’ tax bills tlw2 − tlw1
across sectors and removing the average tax revenue τS from firing, which occurs
with probability s.
Using these effective tax rates and substituting (10), (12) and (13) yields a
change in net fiscal revenue equal to
dT =
(
L2 − τNη2 (1− es)− τEεws (1−N) e
)
w2dtl
+
(
1 + τNη1
)
w1 (1− s) (1−N) dtl
− (1 + τNηh + τEεb) (1− e) s (1−N) db
+
(
1− tl − τSσ + τNηs
)
s (1−N) dts
− (k + τNηm − τEεm) s (1−N) dm.
(14)
The expression decomposes the effect of public policy and behavioral responses
on fiscal revenue. To illustrate, additional active labor market programmes dm in-
creases direct expenditures by k·s (1−N) dm. Net fiscal revenue is further impacted
by education responses, as per (13). There are ηms (1−N) dm less households
choosing to educate into sector 2, each one reducing by τN their tax contribution.
On the other hand, the policy supports job finding at rate εms (1−N) dm, as per
(12). Each person who stops claiming benefits and pays taxes adds τE to govern-
ment revenue. The net fiscal cost of active labor market programmes thus sums up
to
(
k + τNηm − τEεm
)
s (1−N) dm.
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3.2 Welfare maximization
This section derives some properties of welfare maximizing policy.
Throughout the paper, I use a utilitarian welfare criteria. Because of free entry,
firms make no profit so the social welfare function restricts to welfare Vi of entrants
in sector i and the cost of entry in sector 2:
V = (1−N) · V1 +N · V2 −
ˆ N
0
i (n) dn. (15)
Due to occupational choice (6), a variation of entry N yields dV/dN = −V1 +
V2 − i (N) = 0 so welfare variations are dV = (1−N) dV1 + NdV2. Substituting
expressions from section 3.1,
dV = −u′1w1 (1− s) (1−N) dtl − u′2w2L2dtl
+u′h (1− e) s (1−N) db+
[
(1− e)u′hψ′h− φ′ζ
]
s (1−N) dm (16)
− (1− tl −∇σ)u′1s (1−N) dts.
The following technical characterization helps analyze optimal policy:
Lemma 1. (optimality conditions): the policy which maximizes utilitarian wel-
fare (15) and satisfies the government budget constraint (9) verifies:
dV/db =
[
u′h −
(
1 + τNηh + τ
Eεb
)
λ
]
(1− e) s (1−N) = 0,
dV/dts = −
[
(1− tl −∇σ)u′1 −
(
1− tl − τSσ + τNηs
)
λ
]
s (1−N) = 0,
dV/dm =
[
(1− e)u′hψ′h− φ′ζ −
(
k + τNηm − τEεm
)
λ
]
s (1−N) = 0,
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier related to the fiscal constraint.
Proof: see appendix A.
Several properties of optimal policy can be derived from lemma 1, including
moral hazard limitations. These are compiled in the following result:
Proposition 1. (optimal policy characteristics): the social welfare maximizing
policies have the following properties:
(a) an economy without government and social security policy is not optimal, as
unemployment insurance financed with labor taxes increases welfare:
dV
db
> 0 when tl = ts = b = m = 0
(b) unemployment insurance is limited:
u′1
u′h
=
1
1 + τEεb
< 1 u1 > uh
(c) employment protection internalizes firing cost externalities:
ts = tlw1 + [(1− e) b− tlw2e] + km+∇
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(d) active labor market policies depend on costs and search behavior:
due/dm
du1/dc1
=
(1− e)u′hψ′h− φ′ζ
u′1
= k − τEεm
Proof : in part (a), small unemployment benefits db > 0 are financed with taxes
dt > 0 to satisfy the budget constraint dT = 0. Using (14) and (16) at t = b = 0
yields dV/dt > 0 and thus dV/db > 0. Parts (b) to (d) are derived from first order
conditions in lemma 1. Details are contained in appendix A. QED.
I discuss each part of the proposition in turn.
Start from an economy without government and social security policy (tl =
ts = b = m = 0). Part (a) of the proposition shows that a moderate introduction
of unemployment insurance (db > 0) financed with a labor income tax (dt > 0)
to keep the public budget balanced (dT = 0) is welfare improving. An economy
without social security policy is thus not optimal. The result is intuitive: public
insurance discourages job search efforts e and increases unemployment δ; however,
since tax distortions on search behavior are initially small, the gains from insurance
dominate, raising aggregate welfare V .
Part (b) of the proposition illustrates the moral hazard cost of unemployment
insurance. The less elastic job search efforts are (the closer to zero the ε-elasticities),
the smaller the moral hazard cost, the closer insurance is to full consumption
smoothing (u1 = uh) between workers in the good state (sector 1 workers not hit
by the unemployment shock) and the bad state (sector 1 workers hit by the shock).
Low public finance costs of insurance (low tax revenue losses and unemployment
benefits, τE = tlw2 + b) also push towards full consumption smoothing.
Part (c) of the proposition shows that using a firing tax as employment protec-
tion is optimal, as it internalizes negative firing externalities. It plays the same role
as in Blanchard and Tirole (2008). Firms who fire a worker create a fiscal external-
ity, as there is one person less paying taxes tlw1, one person more who collects an
average net benefit (1− e) b− tlw2e and extra spending km on active labor market
policies. Firing also creates a utility loss ∇ = (u1 − ue)/u′1, expressed in income
equivalent terms. All these externalities justify the use of a firing tax.
Note that part (b) and part (c) generalize the optimality results10 from Blan-
chard and Tirole (2008) to the case of moral hazard. Indeed, in the special case of
a single sector 1 (N = 0), no moral hazard (εb = 0) nor reallocation (e = 0) and no
active labor market policies (m = 0), full insurance is optimal (h+ b = (1− tl)w1)
and it is financed by firing taxes only (tl = 0).
Finally, part (d) of the proposition shows that active labor market optimal
policy also depends on other policies. The leftmost part of the optimality conditions
represents the marginal welfare benefit of the policy m, measuring expected welfare
utility gains of a fired worker relative to a retained worker. The optimality condition
equates the marginal welfare benefit of the policy, on the left, with its marginal cost,
on the right. Larger unemployment benefits b increase the participation tax τE =
tlw2+b and thus decrease the net marginal cost of active labor market policy: every
persons put back to work thanks to spending m saves costs b and brings revenue
10Specifically, propositions 1 and 2 from Blanchard and Tirole (2008).
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tlw2. The larger the unemployment insurance benefits, the more attractive active
labor market programmes, typical of flexicurity arrangements. This can explain
why flexicurity measures were first introduced by Northern European countries in
the 1990’s, who started with high unemployment benefits levels and subsequently
introduced large-scale activation measures. In the next subsection, I will perform a
formal analysis of the complementarity of all the policy instruments which are part
of flexicurity.
3.3 Flexicurity as optimal policy
This section contains the main analytical result. I show that flexicurity is the
optimal policy combination under certain circumstances, providing criterias which
separate cases where flexicurity is optimal from cases where it is not.
Flexicurity is a combination which exploits policy complementarity. In its most
general policy discussion sense and its etymological basis, flexicurity compensates
workers for the loss generated by low employment protection (flexibility) with gen-
erous insurance and assistance programmes (security): security is provided in ex-
change for flexibility.
I therefore analyze complementarity of the three instruments of flexicurity in
welfare maximization. Flexicurity corresponds to the case of job protection and
unemployment insurance being substitutes; job protection and activation measures
being substitutes; while unemployment insurance and activation measures are com-
plement.
I provide three preliminary results to characterize policy complementarities,
discuss each of them and conclude with a general result11.
Unemployment insurance and active labor market programmes Comple-
mentarity of unemployment benefits b and activation measures m is characterized
by the following result.
Lemma 2. at the optimum, the
sign
(
d
dm
d
db
V
)
is equal to the sign of
u′′hψ
′h
{
1− λτE(1−e)φζ′′
}
+ λεbτ
E
(1−e)φ
{
1
ζ1
φ′ + 1ζ′
(
1
ζ1
− (1− e)
)
u′hψ
′h
}
+
ληh
{
s
(
εmτ
E − k)− τN u′′hψ′h
u′h
}
Proof: at the optimum and using lemma 1, ddbV =
[
u′h −
(
1 + τNηh + τ
Eεb
)
λ
]
(1− e) s (1−N) = 0, so ddm ddbV = (1− e) s (1−N) ddm
[
u′h −
(
1 + τNηh + τ
Eεb
)
λ
]
.
The sign of ddm
d
dbV is thus equal to the sign of
d
dm
[
u′h −
(
1 + τNηh + τ
Eεb
)
λ
]
,
11For ease of presentation, I provide the results with specifications for certain reduced-forms,
namely ζ (e) = ζ0 + (ζ2 − ζ0) e−ζ1(1−e) and i (n) = i0 − i1 · ln (1− n). Results with general
specifications and different labor income tax rates in the two sectors are contained in appendix B.
13
which, after differentiation and substitutions, equals the expression given in the
lemma. QED.
The following two observations discuss cases where unemployment insurance and
active labor market programmes are complements and when they are substitutes.
Two further cases are discussed in appendix C.
First, when entry is exogenous (dN = ηh = 0) and the difficulty of finding a job
increases rapidly (ζ1 and thus ζ ′ and ζ ′′ are large), unemployment insurance and
active labor market programmes are complements12, ddm
d
dbV > 0. The intuition
for this result is the following. There is a point where the transition from the bad
state (being unemployed) to the good state (finding a job in sector 2) becomes
very difficult without further assistance. As activation measures also reduce home
production benefit (ψ′ < 0), welfare in the bad state can only be maintained when
unemployment benefits follow assistance.
Second, consider the case of endogenous entry (ηh > 0) with large response to
policy variations (ηh is large) and net tax revenue depending little on education
decisions (τN is small). Then, if activation measures are cost-effective (k small)
or unemployment benefits large (εmτE − k > 0, given τE = tlw2 + b), activation
measures and unemployment insurance are complements13, ddm
d
dbV > 0. If activa-
tion measures are not cost-effective and benefits are small (εmτE − k < 0) on the
other hand, they are substitutes, ddm
d
dbV < 0. The intuition is the following. If
unemployment benefits and the entry response are large, many households avoid
the costly entry into the safe sector 2: choosing the easy-access but risky sector
1 is attractive, as generous benefits are provided in case of unemployment. The
quantity εmτE−k represents the marginal gain of one more unit of activation mea-
sures, taking tax gains of re-employment into account. When this marginal gain
is positive, strong activation measures complements large benefits: putting more
people back to work with large assistance helps reduce the aggregate costs of high
unemployment benefits.
Unemployment insurance and employment protection Complementarity
of optimal unemployment benefits b and firing taxes ts is characterized by:
Lemma 3. at the optimum,
sign
(
d
dts
d
db
V
)
= sign (ηs)
Proof: Similar to the proof of lemma 2, ddts
d
dbV has the sign of (1− e) s (1−N)
d
dts
[
u′h − λτNηh − λτEεb
]
. In the first order condition ddbV = u
′
h − (1 + τNηh
+τEεb
)
λ = 0 in lemma 1, u′h represents the marginal gain of one extra unit of
unemployment insurance and − (1 + τNηh + τEεb) its marginal public finance cost.
As the former is positive and the latter negative, λ > 0. Since ddtsu
′
h =
d
dts
τE =
d
dts
εb = 0, the sign of ddts
d
dbV equals the sign of
d
dts
[−τNηh], a derivative which,
after algebraic manipulation, is shown to equal ηhs
(
1− t− στS). From the first
12Indeed, in this case, the sign of d
dm
d
db
V is equal to the sign of u′′hψ
′h, positive.
13In this case, the sign of d
dm
d
db
V is equal to the sign of ληhs
(
εmτ
E − k), positive.
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and second conditions from lemma 1 follows that 1− t− τSσ and 1− t−∇σ have
the same sign. Then ηs = (1− t−∇σ) η1 and η1 > 0 imply that ηhs
(
1− t− στS)
has the same sign as ηhsηs. Noting that ηh > 0 concludes. QED.
I discuss complementarity of insurance and protection in two noteworthy cases.
First, when entry is exogenous (dN = ηs = 0), optimal unemployment insurance
and optimal employment protection are independent, ddts
d
dbV = 0. The sequenc-
ing of events provides the intuition in this case. Households only choose search
efforts, which take place after firing. Whether employment protection is high or
low, whether the flow into unemployment is low or large, public insurance impacts
search efforts of each unemployed the same way. Protection regulates the flow into
the bad state (unemployment) and insurance the flow out of the bad state (into
re-employment), independently. In contrast, when entry is endogenous, the house-
hold choice of sector is jointly impacted by the likelihood of entering the bad state
if sector 1 is chosen (regulated by employment protection) and by the comfort in
this state (impacted by unemployment insurance).
Second, when entry is endogenous (ηs 6= 0), unemployment insurance and em-
ployment protection are substitutes, ddts
d
dbV < 0, if entry in the safe sector increases
with lower protection (ηs < 0), and vice-versa. I discuss the case where entry into
the safe sector increases with lower protection in the risky sector (ηs < 0), more
intuitive. The idea is to reduce employment protection to attract more people into
the costly but safe and productive sector, (partially) curbing inflows into unemploy-
ment and allowing higher welfare (through unemployment insurance) for workers
remaining in the bad state. Low protection invites increased self-insurance against
the unemployment risk through education and reduces the moral hazard cost of
high public insurance: a marginal decrease of employment protection allows for
a marginal increase of unemployment benefits, as more households join the safe
sector14.
Active labor market programmes and employment protection Comple-
mentarity of activation measures m and firing taxes ts is characterized by:
Lemma 4. at the optimum,
sign
(
d
dts
d
dm
V
)
= sign (ηmηs)
Proof: following the same steps as in the proof of lemma 3, one has that ddts
d
dmV
has the sign of ηms
(
1− tl − στS
)
. Noting that 1 − t − τSσ and 1 − t − ∇σ have
the same sign, that ηs = (1− t−∇σ) η1, that η1 > 0 but that ηm and ηs can be
positive or negative concludes. QED.
Two cases are discussed. First, when entry is exogenous (dN = ηm = ηs = 0),
optimal employment protection and activation measures are independent ddts
d
dmV =
14Education as self-insurance against the unemployment risk illustrates a less visible channel of
employment protection. Often, the literature focuses on job creation and separation effects. In
this paper, the self-insurance and separation channels apply, not the job creation one.
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0. The intuition is the same as for lemma 3, activation measures impacting house-
hold decisions during the same phases as unemployment insurance.
Second, consider the case of endogenous entry where entry in the costly but safe
sector increases with low employment protection in the easy-access but risky sector
(ηs < 0 and ηm 6= 0). Then optimal employment protection and activation mea-
sures are substitutes, ddts
d
dmV < 0, if entry in the safe sector decreases with lower
activation (ηm > 0), and vice-versa. The intuition is similar to the endogenous
entry case in lemma 3, with a variation. When the assistance part of activation
measures dominates (φ′ < 0 large in absolute value, so ηm > 0), these measures gen-
erate a similar moral hazard effect as unemployment insurance. Low employment
protection encourages higher entry into the costly but safe sector as self-insurance
against unemployment risk, reducing the moral hazard cost of activation measures
and allowing to provide more assistance. When the sanction part of activation
measures dominates (ψ′ < 0 large in absolute value, so ηm < 0), they have the
opposite incentive effects as unemployment insurance. Increase of self-insurance
with low protection allows to reduce the discomfort of activation measures, which
are reduced.
All three instruments As a corollary15 of lemmas 2, 3 and 4, one obtains the
following characterization of optimal policy:
Proposition 2. (flexicurity as optimal policy): when the costly entry into the
safe sector 2 is negatively related to employment protection (ηs < 0), is negatively
related to active labor market policies (−ηm < 0), active labor market programmes
are cost-effective (k is small), net tax revenue is little affected by education choices
(τN is small) and when the difficulty of finding a job increases rapidly (ζ1 is large),
the welfare maximizing labor market policy is flexicurity, with large unemployment
benefits b, large active labor market programmes m and small firing taxes ts:
d
dm
d
db
V > 0
d
dts
d
db
V < 0
d
dts
d
dm
V < 0
I conclude with four observations. First, conditions in proposition 2 are sufficient
but not necessary. There can be other cases where the optimal policy is flexicurity16.
Discussions of lemmas 2, 3 and 4 provide other such cases.
Second, conditions of proposition 2 are likely to be satisfied for several large
European welfare states, but not all. The condition ηs < 0 is intuitive, as high
employment protection increases the attractiveness of the risky sector. The con-
dition ηm > 0 is satisfied if the assistance part of activation measures dominates
the sanction part, typical in Europe. Those countries which are able to design low
15I take for granted that the combination of high unemployment insurance, large activation mea-
sures and low employment protection is the optimal policy, not the combination of low insurance,
low activation measures and high protection, which also satisfies the cross-derivative optimality
conditions in lemmas 2, 3 and 4. Support is provided by results in section 3.2, showing that the
introduction of unemployment insurance increases welfare.
16Specifically, proposition 2 only assembles the first and second cases discussed after lemma 2,
the second case after lemma 3 and the second case after lemma 4.
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cost activation measures (k small), maintain tax revenue regardless of the education
composition of the population (τN small) and where large persistent unemployment
problems indicate rapidly increasing difficulties in finding jobs (ζ1 large) fulfill the
conditions to benefit from flexicurity policies. Other countries may not.
Third, endogenous entry is key for the result, as the discussion of the self-
insurance channel through education in lemmas 3 and 4 makes clear: low protection
of jobs in the risky sector invites for more self-insurance against the unemployment
risk through costly education, giving access to the safe sector and mitigating the
moral hazard cost of public insurance. These results are consistent and complement
Andersen and Svarer (2014), where activation measures (workfare) reduce the moral
hazard impact of insurance. With exogenous entry, optimal employment protection
is independent of both optimal insurance and optimal activation measures, which
is far from the idea of policy complementarity at the heart of flexicurity.
Fourth, there is a consistent relationship with the cross-country flexicurity anal-
ysis of Algan and Cahuc (2009). Entry decisions in my model are made under
expectation of future economic outcomes, including labor income revenue and the
likelihood of unemployment. In reality, education decisions are also made for other
reasons, such as intellectual satisfaction. When education decisions are solely based
on these other reasons, entry becomes exogenous in the model, in which case optimal
policy does not exhibit the complementarities of flexicurity. Assume that cultural
differences across countries influence education decisions, such that individuals in
countries with high civic values feel more responsible for their own economic destiny
and thus base more of their education choice on economic prospects than in other
countries. Then, entry in high civic values countries is less likely to be exogenous
and flexicurity more likely to be optimal. This outcome is consistent with Algan
and Cahuc (2009), who find that countries with high civic attitudes are associated
with higher unemployment benefits and lower employment protection.
4 Numerical illustration
Numerical examples provide an illustration of the theory. I show that flexicurity is
the optimal labor market policy in one case and it is not in another case. Both cases
use realistic parameter values, differentiated by the job search elasticity parameter.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) argue that human capital losses through unem-
ployment play a role in imperfect labor markets. To reflect their conclusion and
deliver more realistic outcomes, I enrich the model. I separate prospects for sector
2 entrants and prospects for sector 1 entrants who were fired, retrained and found
a job in sector 2. As the latter suffered from a human capital loss, they are less
productive and earn a lower wage, wr < w2. I also assume that sunk investments
costs are paid when a firm is created. All theoretical results carry through.
Calibration relies on direct observations or empirical studies. The only excep-
tions are parameter values for the active labor market policy functions ψ and φ.
Sensitivity analysis using different values however lead to the same results, with
greater or smaller contrasts. Sensitivity analysis on other parameters also lead to
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the same outcomes17, with the exception of active labor market policy unitary costs
k: when those costs are large, no active labor market programmes are ever provided.
Because such an outcome is unrealistic, I focus on lower costs, using a discipline
detailed in appendix D.
To allow comparisons with theoretical results, I use the functional forms for ζ (e)
and i (n) from section 3.3. I rely on empirical studies to set the job search elasticity
parameter: the key parameter ζ1 (see proposition 2) is inversely proportional to the
elasticity of re-employment probability with respect to unemployment benefits ε.
As per the Krueger and Meyer (2002) survey and normalizing, ε values between 0.4
and 2 are plausible. The lower value corresponds to empirical studies which take
policy endogeneity into account, such as Card and Levine (2000), more appropriate
in our general equilibrium setting. I settle for a benchmark value ε = 0.6 and
consider higher values in alternative cases. Appendix D presents the details for the
entire calibration.
Baseline Low difficulty
CONT FIRE OPT CONT FIRE OPT
Policy:
tl Labor tax 0.115 0.146 0.147 0.110 0.141 0.143
br Net replacement rate UI 0.383 0.423 0.430 0.314 0.351 0.256
ts Firing tax EP 0.500 0.136 0.114 0.500 0.118 0.098
m Programmes ALMP - - 1.343 - - 0.968
Economic impact:
N Sector 2 entry rate 0.557 0.583 0.586 0.557 0.583 0.586
s Separation rate 0.146 0.220 0.225 0.146 0.224 0.229
e Reemployment rate 0.676 0.665 0.760 0.753 0.738 0.907
δ Unemployment rate 0.026 0.043 0.032 0.020 0.034 0.012
w Avg wage per worker 0.836 0.876 0.879 0.837 0.879 0.882
X GDP, %) 0.000 0.120 1.342 0.000 0.436 2.726
V Welfare, *) 0.000 3.542 4.380 0.000 3.747 4.544
Net replacement rate br = b/ (1− tl). %) relative change in percent. *) Welfare relative
change in percent of GDP, 100 · (V − V 0)/X0. Taxes in all simulations are optimal.
(Baseline): baseline case, with job search elasticity ε = 0.6 (yielding ζ1 = 15.9)
(Low difficulty): low job search difficulty increase, with elasticity ε = 1.0 (yielding ζ1 = 9.5)
(CONT): as in typical continental Europe, exogenous high EP, optimal UI, no ALMP
(FIRE): optimal EP (free firing) and optimal UI, no ALMP
(OPT): optimal UI, EP and ALMP policies
Table 1: Comparative statics, various labor market policies
Table 1 presents the results in two main cases. The baseline case assumes an
elasticity ε = 0.6, consistent with difficult job search (larger ζ1). The low difficulty
17Sensitivity analysis was performed for risk aversion ρ, the wage structure w1, wr, w2, the
entry elasticity η (which delivers values for the parameters of the entry cost function i (n)), home
production h, dispersion in the productivity shocks z (which delivers values for the distribution
g (x)), active labor market assistance φ, reduction in home production benefits ψ and unitary costs
k.
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case uses an elasticity ε = 1.0, consistent with easier job search (smaller ζ1). In each
case, I compare three labor market policy settings. In the CONT column, unem-
ployment insurance is endogenously provided at an optimal level but there are no
active labor market programmes and employment protection is fixed exogenously
at a moderately high level, corresponding to a stylized continental European coun-
try. In the FIRE column, employment protection becomes endogenous and free to
adjust. In the OPT column, active labor market policies are added, so that optimal
levels of unemployment insurance, employment protection and activation measures
are provided.
The main finding is that flexicurity is the optimal policy in the baseline case
but it is not in the low difficulty case. While low employment protection and large
amount of active labor market policies are optimal in both cases, unemployment
benefits are maintained at a high level only in the first case. This outcome is
consistent with proposition 2, which showed that flexicurity was more likely to
be optimal when the difficulty of finding a job increases rapidly (large ζ1). The
intuition is the same as for lemma 2 and proposition 2: in short, when finding a
job alone becomes rapidly difficult, job search assistance helps most, high insurance
compensating for the drop in home production associated with activation measures.
Other findings relate to Schumpeterian creative destruction. In the absence of
active labor market programmes, high employment protection reduces inflows into
unemployment but at a welfare cost, under a utilitarian criteria. Although the
number of unemployed is smaller, there are more low productivity jobs in sector
1, reducing the average productivity and output capacity of the economy. The
average wage per worker jumps from 0.84 to 0.88 when employment protection is
reduced, output increases 0.1% but unemployment increases about 1.7 percentage
points (FIRE versus CONT cases).
In this context, activation measures are of particular interest, when cost ef-
fective. Supporting job reallocation and the re-employment rate, which climbs 8
percentage points or more, brings the unemployment rate back to low levels, in-
creases aggregate production more than 1% and welfare18 4% (OPT versus CONT
cases). The optimal labor market policy, thanks to low employment protection com-
pensated by active labor market programmes, strikes a welfare improving balance
between low unemployment and high aggregate productivity19.
Table 1 illustrates further theoretical results. Comparing employment protec-
tion and insurance policies in the CONT and FIRE cases show that there is a
trade-off between the two policies, consistent with lemma 3. Comparing the level
of employment protection and active labor market programmes in the FIRE and
OPT cases exhibits a trade-off between the two policies, as in lemma 4. Although
the effect is moderate, lower firing taxes encourages costly education to access the
safe sector 2, illustrating the impact of employment protection on self-insurance via
education, as discussed in lemmas 3 and 4.
18The welfare measure is defined as the percentage variation of GDP, 100 · (V − V0)/X0, to
remove scale effects. I do not use a measure based on either equivalent or compensating variations
because of the absence of a representative agent in the model.
19Sensitivity analysis shows that the balancing pattern is always present but the magnitude of
the gains depends on parameters. Numerical values presented in the table should thus not be
taken literally for policy design.
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I finish with another connection to the cross-country analysis of Algan and
Cahuc (2009). High ζ1 (low ε) can be interpreted as more adverse labor markets
or as higher propensity for job search efforts. Assume that cultural differences
across countries influence job search behavior, such that unemployed in high civic
values countries search hard, whatever the level of unemployment benefits. In these
countries, the job search elasticity ε is low (baseline case). Consistent with Algan
and Cahuc (2009), numerical examples show that flexicurity is more beneficial in
countries with high civic values than other countries.
5 Concluding remarks
The paper identifies conditions under which flexicurity is an optimal policy combina-
tion, which depend crucially on the education behavior of households. If education
choices are unrelated to economic conditions, because intellectual satisfaction is the
prime objective of education or for other reasons, the optimal level of employment
protection is unrelated to the optimal level of unemployment insurance and active
labor market programmes. In absence of complementarity, flexibility can not be ex-
changed for security, the heart of flexicurity. If however education choices depend
on economic conditions, flexicurity can be optimal, as low employment protection
provides incentives for costly self-insurance against unemployment risk through edu-
cation, mitigating the moral hazard cost of unemployment insurance and activation
programmes.
The analysis has shown that flexicurity is optimal in some cases, but not all.
Other analysis related to flexicurity have also reached case-dependent conclusions.
Algan and Cahuc (2009) show for instance that civic attitudes play a role, and
Boeri, Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2012), the share of educated households.
The first main general policy conclusion is that the design of labor market poli-
cies with employment protection, unemployment insurance and active labor market
programmes should take education behavior and policy into account. Countries
which consider that higher education financing is an individual responsibility may
find flexicurity more attractive, as the incentive for self-insurance through educa-
tion is larger. The second conclusion is that the difficulty of finding a job, whether
coming from frictions or weak demand, plays a role. Flexicurity is of interest mainly
when difficulty is established and search efforts high.
To maintain tractability and obtain analytical results despite the number of
policy instruments, the model is kept simple: it is static, labor supply by employed
workers is inelastic and reduced-form specifications are used. Overall, I believe that
simplifications alone do not weaken the case for flexicurity.
Results should indeed hold in a dynamic framework. The self-insurance com-
ponent of education, encouraged with low employment protection, is still there if
households can self-insure against unemployment with savings, even if the education
insurance component is smaller. Quantitative analysis by Heathcote, Storesletten
and Violante (2010) actually find that self-insurance through education is larger
than through savings.
Optimal flexicurity cases should also remain with elastic labor supply. Indeed,
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labor income taxes would become more distortive and increase the attractiveness
of firing taxes as a financing instrument. Although the wedge would be of differ-
ent magnitude, a marginal decrease of employment protection will still allow for a
marginal increase of unemployment benefits under self-insurance via education.
Finally, the numerical analysis has shown that outcomes are not sensitive to the
parameters of the reduced form specifications, except the job finding probability
(the job search effort cost function ζ): in the two cases considered, flexicurity is
optimal if finding a job is hard, and vice-versa. Parameter values used in the two
cases fall in the range of empirical estimates for job search elasticities, so both
outcomes are realistic. Beyond parameter values, functional form choices for the
job finding probability may impose extra discipline in the model which ignores part
of the complexity of imperfect labor markets. As policy trade-offs remain the same
however, using alternative specifications should not qualitatively alter conclusions.
Confirming these three predictions is left for future research.
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A Appendix: additional proofs
Proofs provided in this appendix apply to the general case where labor income tax
rates in the first and second sector can differ: the tax in the first sector is t1 and it
is t2 in the second sector, replacing the unique tax rate tl. The model and analysis
are adjusted in an intuitive fashion20.
Extension of the technical lemma 1 and proofs are provided in continuation.
Lemma 1 extension21: under the conditions of lemma 1,
dV/dt1 = −
[
u′1 −
(
1 + τNη1
)
λ
]
w1 (1− s) (1−N) = 0,
dV/dt2 = −
[
u′2 − λ
(
1− τNη2 (1− es) /L2 − τEεws (1−N) e/L2
)]
L2w2 = 0.
Proof of lemma 1: the optimization problem is V = maxt1,t2,b,ts,m(1−N) ·V1 +
N · V2 −
´ N
0 i (n) dn.+ λT . Even though the sector choice is discrete, continuity of
the entry cost function i (n) and uniform distribution of ability n lead to continuous
changes in the welfare function V , ensuring existence of a maximum. The endoge-
nous allocation sector condition (6) leads to dV = (1−N) dV1+NdV2+λdT . Using
(16) and (14), dV/db =
[
u′h −
(
1 + τNηh + τ
Eεb
)
λ
]
(1− e) s (1−N), and similarly
for other conditions. QED.
Proof part (a) proposition 1: starting from a free market equilibrium with zero
taxes implies τ j = 0. Thus, financing small benefits db > 0 with taxes dt > 0 to
satisfy the budget constraint dT = 0 with (14) requires Γdt = (1− e) s (1−N) db
with Γ ≡ w1 (1− s) (1−N) + w2L2. Substituting into (16) and evaluating at
t = b = 0 yields
dV
dt
∣∣∣∣
b=0
=
[
1− u
′
1
u′h
w1 (1− s) (1−N)
Γ
− u
′
2
u′h
w2L2
Γ
]
Γu′h > 0,
the sign due to w2 > w1 > h, u′i/u
′
h < 1 and the fact that the weights of these
ratios sum to 1. QED.
Proof part (b) proposition 1: dividing the condition of lemma 1 λ = u′1/
(
1 + τNη1
)
by the condition λ = u′h/
(
1 + τNηh + τ
Eεb
)
, using η1 = u′1/ (1−N) i′ and ηh =
20For the sake of completion, adjustments in the model are V1 = (1− s) · u ((1− t1)w1) +
s · ue, V2 = u ((1− t2)w2), T = t2w2L2 + t1w1L1 + tss (1−N) − [δb+mks (1−N) + C],
u1 = u ((1− t1)w1), uh = u (ψ(m)h+ b) and u2 = u ((1− t2)w2). Search response (12) ad-
justs to de = −εww2e · dt2 − εb (1− e) · db + εm · dm, while education response (13) changes
to dN = η1w1 (1− s) (1−N) dt1 − η2w2 (1− es) dt2−ηh (1− e) s (1−N) db + ηss (1−N) dts −
ηms (1−N) dm, with ηs = (1− t1 −∇σ) η1. The fiscal impact of policy (14) becomes
dT =
(
L2 − τNη2 (1− es)− τEεws (1−N) e
)
w2dt2 +
(
1 + τNη1
)
w1 (1− s) (1−N) dt1
− (1 + τNηh + τEεb) (1− e) s (1−N) db+ (1− t1 − τSσ + τNηs) s (1−N) dts
− (k + τNηm − τEεm) s (1−N) dm,
while welfare variations (16) is
dV = −u′1w1 (1− s) (1−N) dt1 − u′2w2L2dt2 + u′h (1− e) s (1−N) db+[
(1− e)u′hψ′h− φ′ζ
]
s (1−N) dm− (1− t1 −∇σ)u′1s (1−N) dts.
21The condition dV/dts is also adjusted by replacing tl with t1.
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u′h/ (1−N) i′, one has u′1
(
1 + τNu′h/ (1−N) i′ + τEεb
)
= u′h
(
1 + τNu′1/ (1−N) i′
)
,
or u′1
(
1 + τEεb
)
= u′h. Thus, using the fact that elasticities εj > 0 and τ
E =
t2w2 + b > 0, u′1/u′h = 1/
(
1 + τEεb
)
< 1. The concavity of the utility function
concludes part (b), u1 > uh. QED.
Proof part (c) proposition 1: similar proof as for part (b), using the conditions
λ = u′1/
(
1 + τNη1
)
and λ = (1− t1 −∇σ)u′1/
(
1− t1 − τSσ + τNηs
)
of lemma 1
and the intermediate result ∇ = τS . QED.
Proof part (d) proposition 1: similar proof as for part (b), using the conditions
λ = u′1/
(
1 + τNη1
)
and λ = [(1− e)u′hψ′h− φ′ζ] /
(
k + τNηm − τEεm
)
of lemma
1 together with the envelope theorem on ue in (5). QED.
B Appendix: general optimality result
This appendix provides the optimality results from section 3.3 in a general context,
without specification assumptions on reduced-forms and when labor tax rates in
the two sectors can differ.
Proposition. at the optimum,
sign
(
d
dm
d
db
V
)
is equal to the sign of
u′′hψ
′h
(
1− λτE(1−e)φζ′′
)
+
λεbτ
E
(1−e)φζ′′
{[
ζ ′ + (1− e)
(
ζ ′′ − ζ′ζ′′′ζ′′
)]
φ′ +
(
1− (1− e) ζ′′′ζ′′
)
u′hψ
′h
}
+
ληh
{
s
(
εmτ
E − k)− τN (u′′hψ′h
u′h
− ηms
[
1− (1−N) i′′(N)i′(N)
])}
;
and
sign
(
d
dts
d
db
V
)
= sign
(
ηs
[
1
η1
− τN
(
1− (1−N) i
′′(N)
i′(N)
)])
;
and
sign
(
d
dts
d
dm
V
)
= sign
(
ηmηs
[
1
η1
− τN
(
1− (1−N) i
′′(N)
i′(N)
)])
.
Proof: same steps as the proofs of lemmas 2, 3 and 4 with general specifications
for ζ (e) and i (n). When tax rates in the two sectors differ elasticity responses εi,
ηj and τk are different but the result remains. QED.
As a verification, one can use specifications of reduced-forms and obtain the
results from section 3.3. With ζ (e) = ζ0 + (ζ2 − ζ0) e−ζ1(1−e) and i (n) = i0 − i1 ·
ln (1− n), one has ζ ′′ (e) = ζ1ζ ′ (e), ζ ′′′ (e) = ζ1ζ ′′ (e) and i′′ (n) = i′ (n) / (1− n).
Plugging these expressions into the proposition delivers the expected results.
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Parameter Value Sources
Sector 2 wages w2 1 Normalization
Retrained wages wr 0.9 (w1 + w2)/2
Sector 1 wages (no policy) w1 0.8 Van Reenen (1996)
Workers’ risk-aversion ρ 1.5 Standard
Home production value h/wr 0.2 Hall and Milgrom (2008)
Productivity shock dispersion z 3 See text
Elasticity of job search ε 0.6 See text
Semi-elasticity of entry η 0.33 See text
ALMP assistance minimum φ0 0.2 See text
ALMP assistance curvature φ1 2 See text
ALMP home prod cost minimum ψ0 0.8 See text
ALMP home prod cost curvature ψ1 2 See text
ALMP unitary cost k varies See text
Share of public spending C0/X0 0.15 Standard
Table 2: Parameters for numerical illustration.
C Appendix: UI and ALMP substitutability
This appendix discuss two cases where optimal unemployment insurance and active
labor market programmes are substitutes, using lemma 2.
First, when entry is exogenous (dN = ηh = 0) and home production is small
(h is small), unemployment insurance and active labor market programmes are
substitutes, ddm
d
dbV < 0. The intuition is as follows. Because home production
is small, most of the impact of activation measures is through assistance, not the
reduction of home production benefits. These measures thus mostly impact the
transition from the bad to the good state, not the value of the bad state. Lower
unemployment benefits make the bad state less attractive, increasing job search
efforts and thus further increasing the transition rate to the good state. Active
labor market policies and unemployment insurance are substitute. With utilitarian
welfare, even though the bad state is worse, less people remain in this state. In
contrast, when home production is not small, increased activation measures also
reduce much home production and thus the value of the bad state, in which case a
reduction in unemployment benefits is detrimental.
Second, when entry is endogenous but only has a small response to policy varia-
tions (ηh is small), the first two terms in the lemma dominate and the same outcomes
and intuition as exogenous entry apply.
D Appendix: calibration details
Table 2 provides an overview of the parameter values used in the numerical illus-
tration.
The utility function u has a CRRA form u (c) = c1−ρ/ (1− ρ). Other functional
forms are chosen to match the requirements of the model and to satisfy Inada-type
conditions, ensuring smooth numerical computation.
Productivity is distributed uniformly over [x¯− z, x¯+ z], where the dispersion
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z comes from empirical estimates of the firing elasticity in Garibaldi and Pacelli
(2008) and x¯ from a sector 1 separation rate of s = 0.25, chosen to be consistent
with observed economy-wide separation rates of 0.10. The sector 1 wage w1 is
endogenously defined. A value for w1 is used when there is no policy to pin down
x¯.
The elasticity of job search ε provides the key parameter ζ1 in the search cost
function ζ (e) = ζ2e−ζ1(1−e). ζ2 is set to match a targeted unemployment rate of 0.06
when there is no policy. The optimality condition (11) and differentiation delivers
the link ζ1 = u′hwr/ε (ur − uh). In their survey, Krueger and Meyer (2002) consider
that a value of 0.5 for the elasticity d of unemployment duration with respect to
the level of unemployment benefits is a fair summary for the US. Empirical studies
taking policy endogeneity into account, such as Card and Levine (2000), find a
value close to 0.1. Using the average unemployment duration in the US delivers
a relationship between the job search elasticity ε and the unemployment duration
elasticity d, namely ε = d · wr(1− δ)/3bs (1−N). Hence, ε ranges from 0.4 to 2,
the lower range corresponding to empirical estimates dealing explicitly with policy
endogeneity, more appropriate in a general equilibrium context. I choose a baseline
value 0.6.
The semi-elasticity of entry η provides the curvature parameter i1 in the entry
cost function i (n) = i0 − i1 · ln (1− n). The shift parameter i0 follows directly
from (6), which, through differentiation, also delivers i1 = |V2| (1−N) /η. Using
estimates of the elasticity of university enrollment with respect to the college wage
premium, from Jacob (2002) and other references, delivers values for η comprised
between 0.2 and 0.8. I take a conservative value of 0.33 in the baseline case.
Given the diversity of empirical estimates of the effects of active labor market
programmes, I choose parameter values for the home production reduction effect
ψ(m) = ψ0 + (1− ψ0) e−ψ1m and for the job search assistance effect φ (m) = φ0 +
(1− φ0) e−φ1m in an arbitrary but plausible fashion. I use a range of values to
measure the sensitivity of the results to the parameter choices.
Calibration of the unitary cost k of active labor market programmes targets
aggregate expenditures, as Andersen and Svarer (2014). There are no standard
units to measure the amount m of ALMP delivered, which would be consistent for
both resource-intensive training courses and cheaper monitoring activities. Simi-
larly, the unitary cost k of ALMP differ. In the numerical illustration I choose a
different value k in each simulation so that aggregate expenditures mks (1−N) for
ALMP are consistent with observations, relative to aggregate expenditures δb for
unemployment insurance (targeting a 1/2 ratio, as per OECD, 2009).
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